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Uncertain Consumer Tastes and Two-Part Tariff 
 
Abstract: A service provider sells to homogenous risk-averse consumers through a two-part 
tariff. The consumers have uncertain tastes toward the service. They subscribe the service 
before the uncertainty resolves. In contrast with the common view that a monopolist’s 
optimal two-part tariff for homogenous consumers should entail a usage rate equaling to the 
firm’s marginal production cost, I show that when consumers have uncertain tastes, the 
service provider’s optimal two-part tariff entails a usage rate that is greater than the marginal 
cost.  
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1. Introduction   
Consumers’ choices or decisions often depend on some situational variables that are beyond 
the control of the consumers (Belk, 1975). As long as we cannot identify all the situational 
variables that affect a consumer’s taste, we may have to view the consumer’s taste as an 
uncertain one. The economic significance of uncertain taste or preference is well recognized 
in the literature (McFadden, 2001). Compared to the microeconometric studies in this area, 
much less attention is allocated to the analytical modeling of economic mechanism that 
uncertain tastes affect the behaviors of firms and consumers. Chang (1993) investigates the 
strategic use of flexible manufacturing technology as an entry-deterring mechanism when 
consumers’ tastes fluctuate probabilistically. It is shown that for relevant parameter values, 
an incumbent firm holds excess flexibility in manufacturing in order to deter entry into the 
market. Walsh (1995) develops models of an expected-utility-maximizing consumer faced 
with the problem of purchasing multiple units for multiple future consumption occasions. 
The consumer chooses from two consumption alternatives. The utilities of the alternatives to 
the consumer depend on the state of nature. Walsh shows that the consumer may wish to 
purchase an assortment of alternatives rather than multiple units of the same alternative. 
Walsh considers the individual uncertainties in consumer tastes, while Chang focuses on the 
aggregate uncertainty.   
The fact that individual consumers have uncertain tastes may influence the pricing 
strategies of firms. The issue is particularly interesting in markets where (i) trade contracts 
are signed before the uncertainty in tastes resolves, and (ii) the products in consideration are 
non-storable. Indeed, if transactions occur after the uncertainty resolves, the firms in the   4
markets necessarily face (ex post) heterogeneous consumers. This is a typical asymmetric 
information or second-degree price discrimination issue, which has been extensively 
discussed in the literature. If the products are storable, consumers may resell unused 
products or save them for future consumption. Hence the consumers do not take much risk 
although they have to trade with firms before knowing their tastes in future periods. What 
really matters to the firms in this case might be the aggregate demand of the consumers. If 
the individual uncertainties are independent, which means that the aggregate demand is 
rather stable, the impact of uncertain consumer tastes on firms’ pricing strategies would not 
be significant. Many service industries have the two features mentioned above.   
In economic literature, a decision maker is said to face a “risk” if his well-being depends 
on outcomes that will occur with probabilities. When consumers’ tastes toward a service rely 
on some situational variables, the consumers may face a risk if they have to subscribe the 
service for future usage. For example, a consumer extracts a large benefit from a piece of 
bread only when he happens to be hungry. If the consumer is provided with a certain amount 
of bread each day, he may value the bread differently in different days. Hence the consumer 
perceives “risk” from subscribing such a stream of bread. In the Arrow-Pratt theory of risk, a 
consumer’s attitude toward risk is portrayed by a Bernoulli utility function (the terminology 
follows the textbook of Mas-Colell et al., 1995, page 184). Unlike a utility function that is 
defined on consumption bundles and represents a consumer’s ordinal preference, a Bernoulli 
utility function is often defined on a numeraire good like “money” and represents a 
consumer’s cardinal preference over different quantities of the good (but the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility can be viewed as ordinal on a space of “money   5
lotteries”). In a market where people make consumption decisions after an uncertain 
situational variable resolves, one way to capture the role of consumers’ attitude toward risk 
might be defining a Bernoulli utility function on the ex post satisfaction levels that the 
consumers achieve from the gaming. Indeed, all the “risk” that the consumers care about is 
the uncertainty in the ex post satisfaction levels.   
Service industries often have relatively high setup costs but low marginal costs, i.e., 
increasing return to scale. Such a cost structure implies that compared to a two-part tariff, 
linear pricing in service trade is typically less efficient since it leads to more deadweight loss. 
On the other hand, two-part tariffs are often feasible in service markets because it is 
relatively easy to prevent reselling. Standard service pricing theories, e.g., Oi (1971), often 
suggest that when consumers are homogenous and firms’ capacities are non-binding, the 
optimal two-part tariffs should entail usage rates equaling to the firms’ marginal production 
costs. Such two-part tariffs appear attractive because the deadweight loss is avoided. 
However, the result is based on the assumption that consumer tastes are constant and 
anticipatable. It might not hold when consumers have uncertain tastes.   
This paper considers a simple model where a service provider directly sells to a large 
number of homogenous risk-averse consumers. The consumers have uncertain tastes toward 
the service, or equivalently, they attain uncertain benefits from a certain amount of the 
service. In the game, the service provider moves first by offering a service plan represented 
by a two-part tariff. The consumers then choose whether to subscribe the service before the 
uncertainty in their tastes resolves. Finally the uncertainty resolves and the consumers 
choose consumption bundles to maximize their ex post well-being. In the model, a Bernoulli   6
utility function is defined on the consumers’ ex post benefits from the consumptions. Hence 
the ex post benefits, which depend on the state of nature, play the role of “money lottery” in 
the Arrow-Pratt theory of risk. The model shows that if the consumers are risk-averse, the 
service provider’s optimal two-part tariff generally entails a usage rate that is greater than the 
provider’s marginal production cost. The provider chooses such a usage rate because it 
reduces the risk faced by the consumers. The provider faces the tradeoff between insuring 
the consumers and avoiding the deadweight loss when it chooses the optimal usage rate.   
The rest of the paper will proceed as follow. Section 2 presents a monopoly model of a 
service market. I first consider the case where consumers have constant and anticipatable 
tastes, then the case where consumers have uncertain tastes. The comparison of the two cases 
demonstrates how the uncertainty in consumer tastes affects the service provider’s pricing 
strategy. An example that illustrates the main points of the model is given at the end of 
Section 2. Section 3 concludes the paper.   
 
2. A Model   
A service provider sells to a large number of homogenous consumers. The provider’s 
production cost is represented by  () Cq F c q = + , where  0 F ≥  is the fixed cost,  0 c ≥  is 
the marginal cost, and  0 q ≥  is the quantity of the service. The provider offers a service 
plan represented by a two-part tariff  (,) Tp, where T is a lump sum fee and p is the rate of 
usage charge. The consumers also use a numeraire good that  represents their other 
consumptions. The quantity of the numeraire is denoted as m.  
I first consider the case where the homogenous consumers have constant and   7
anticipatable tastes toward the service. Suppose that a consumer obtains benefit of  ( ) bq m +  
from consumption bundle  (, ) qm. Note that function  () bq m +  is a “household production 
function”: consumers use consumption bundles to produce satisfactions measured by the 
numeraire good. The household production function can also be viewed as a utility function 
when the consumers have anticipatable tastes. Let  '( ) 0 bq> , "( ) 0 bq < , which mean that 
the consumer obtains positive but diminishing marginal benefit from using the service. Also 
assume that  '(0) bc >  and  '( ) 0 b ∞=  for simplicity. Finally, each consumer has an 
endowment of  0 I >   in term of the numeraire good.   
The timing of the game is as follow. First, the provider announces a service plan 
represented by a two-part tariff  (,) Tp; Second, the consumers decide whether to accept the 
plan. If the consumers reject the plan, the game is over. Otherwise the consumers pay the 
lump sum fee T and the game goes to the next stage; Third, the consumers decide how much 
of the service to use. Note that the game can be easily extended to a game where consumers 
subscribe the service for multiple periods, as long as the consumers’ demand for the service 
has zero intertemporary elasticity of substitution.   
I will solve the game backward and find the service provider’s optimal two-part tariff. 
Note that the provider would never offer a service plan with a usage rate  '(0) pb ≥ , because 
that would totally prevent the consumers from using the service. The outcome of the second 
and third stage of the game is characterized by following lemma.   
Lemma 1: Given the provider’s two-part tariff (T, p) with  '(0) pb < , define consumption 
bundle 
** (, ) qm b y     8
* '( ) bq p =   and  
** mI T p q =−− .                 (1) 
If 
** () ( 0 ) bq b T p q −≥ + , the consumers accept the service plan and choose consumption 
bundle 
** (, ) q m ; Otherwise the consumers reject the plan.   
Proof: Given tariff (T, p), a consumer obtains benefit of  (0) bI +   if he rejects the plan. The 
consumer’s benefit from taking the plan is given by following maximization problem:   
0, qm Max
≥  () bq m + ,                         ( 2 )  
s.t,  Tp q mI + +≤ ,                         ( 3 )  
Solving the problem yields consumption bundle 
** (, ) qm  prescribed in (1). Obviously, if   
** () ( 0 ) bq m b I +≥ + ,  i.e.,  
** () ( 0 ) bq b T p q −≥ + ,          ( 4 )  
the consumer prefers accepting the plan, which means 
** (, ) qm  is his optimal consumption 
bundle. Otherwise the consumer prefers rejecting the plan.    Q.E.D. 
 
The provider does not want to propose a plan that scares the consumers away and results 
in zero profit. As long as F and c are not too large, the provider’s profit-maximization 
problem, as shown below, has a non-degenerated solution.   
, Tp Max () TF pc q − +−                       ( 5 )  
s.t.,   () ( 0 ) bq b T p q − ≥+ ,                       ( 6 )  
   '( ) bq p = ,                                ( 7 )  
The model can be viewed as a special case of Oi (1971)’s Disneyland model with 
homogenous consumers (page 80). We have following proposition, which states that the 
provider’s optimal two-part tariff entails a usage rate equaling to the provider’s marginal   9
production cost. The proof is easy if one notices that the constraint (6) must be binding at the 
optimal two-part tariff. Details are omitted.   
Proposition 1 (Oi, 1971):  With constant and anticipatable consumer tastes, the service 
provider’s optimal two-part tariff 
** (,) Tp i s  
** (( ) ( 0 ) , bq b c q −− ) c , where 
* q  is given by 
* '( ) bq c = .   
Now suppose that the consumers have uncertain but independent tastes toward the 
service. Specifically, a representative consumer’s taste depends on the state of nature s, 
which is a random variable with cumulative distribution function G(.) on [,] ss where 
ss < . In state s, the consumer has ex post “household production function” of  (,) bsq m + . 
Note that the household production function is definitely not a Bernoulli utility function. 
Hence the quasi-linearity of the function does not imply that the consumer is risk-neutral. I 
assume  (,) 0 q bs q> , ( , ) 0 qq bs q < , ( , ) 0 s bs q>  and  ( , ) ( , ) 0 sq qs bs q bs q = >  for  all 
[,] ss s ∈  and  0 q ≥ . Hence both the consumer’s benefit and marginal benefit from using 
the service increase with variable s. To simplify the exposition, I assume that  (, 0 ) q bs b c => 
for all  [,] ss s ∈ . Hence the consumer would not use the service at all if the usage rate is 
higher than b . We view the ex post benefit of the consumer  ( , ) bsq m +  as a “money 
lottery” against the state of nature s. Therefore we can define a Bernoulli utility function 
() ux , where  ( , ) x bsq m ≡+  and  '( ) 0 ux>  for all  x R ∈ . The risk-aversion of the 
consumer implies that  "( ) 0 ux < .  
The timing of the game with uncertain consumer tastes is as follow. First, the service 
provider announces a two-part tariff (,) Tp; Second, the consumers decide whether to   10
accept the plan. If the consumers reject the plan, the game is over. Otherwise the consumers 
pay the lump sum T and the game goes to the next stage; Third, the uncertainty in tastes 
resolves and the consumers decide how much of the service to use.   
Given the provider’s service plan (T, p) with  p b < , if a consumer accepts the plan, he 
chooses (q, m) to solve following problem after the state of nature realizes.     
0, qm Max
≥  (,) bsq m + ,                         ( 8 )  
s.t.,  Tp q mI + +≤ ,                         ( 9 )  
Conditional on the service plan (T, p) being accepted by the consumer, the optimal 
consumption bundle in state s, denoted as  ((,, ) , (,, ) ) qs Tpm s Tp , satisfies   
(,(, , ) ) q bs q s Tp p =   a n d    ( ,,) ( ,,) msT p I T p qsT p = −− .       ( 1 0 )  
To simplify the exposition, I denote the consumption bundle ((,, ) , (,, ) ) qs Tpm s Tp  as 
(() , () ) qs ms  hereafter. A consumer’s “ex post benefit” in state s is thus  (,() ) () bsqs ms + . 
The main result of the model is presented in following proposition.   
Proposition 2: When the risk-averse consumers have uncertain tastes toward the service, the 
service provider’s optimal two-part tariff (
** , T p ) entails a usage rate 
* p c > .  
Proof: At the first stage of the game, the service provider’s profit-maximization problem is   
, Tp Max  () ( ) ( )
s
s TF pc q s d G s −+ − ∫ ,                   ( 1 1 )  
s.t.,   ( ( , ( ) ) ( ) )( ) ( ( , 0 ))( )
ss
ss ubsqs ms d Gs ubs Id Gs +≥ + ∫∫ .         ( 1 2 )  
The consumption bundle  (() , () ) qs ms  is given by (10). Since there is no direct constraint 
on T or p, the problem must have an interior solution. It can be transformed into following 
optimization problem:     11
,, 0 Tp Max
λ≥   (,,) LT pλ () ( ) ( )
s
s TF pc q s d G s =−+ − ∫  
[((,() ) () ) ((, 0 ) ) ] ()
s
s ubsqs ms ubs I d Gs λ −+ − + ∫ ,     ( 1 3 )  
where ( , , ) LT pλ  is the Lagrangian function of the original problem. The optimal two-part 
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Note that  1 '( ( , ( )) ( )) ub s qs m s λ −+   is strictly increasing with respect to s because   
'( ( , ( )) ( ))
" ((,() ) () ) (,() ) 0 s
ub s qs m s







.   (16) 
Hence equation (14) implies that there exists 
0 (,) s ss ∈  such  that  
0 1' ( ( , ( ) ) ( ) ) 0
sss ub s qs m s λ
≤< −+ < ,   
0 1' ( ( , ( ) ) ( ) ) 0
ss ub s qs m s λ
= −+ = ,  
and   0 1' ( ( , ( ) ) ( ) ) 0
ss s ub s qs m s λ
<≤ − +> .               ( 1 7 )  
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.       ( 1 8 )  
Hence the quantity demanded increases with the state of nature s. We have   
() [ 1 ' ((,() ) () ) ] ()
s
s qs ubsqs ms d Gs λ −+ ∫    12
=
0
() [ 1 ' ((,() ) () ) ] ()
s
s qs ubsqs ms d Gs λ −+ ∫ 0 () [ 1 ' ((,() ) () ) ] ()
s
s qs vbsqs ms d Gs λ +− + ∫  
>
0
0 () [ 1 ' ( ( , ( ) ) ( ) ) ] ( )
s
s qs u bsqs ms d Gs λ −+ ∫ 0
0 ()[ 1 ' ( ( , ( ) ) ( ) ) ] ( )
s
s qs ubsqs ms d Gs λ +− + ∫  
=
0 ()[ 1 ' ( ( , ( ) ) ( ) ) ] ( )0
s
s qs ubsqs ms d Gs λ − += ∫ .         ( 1 9 )  
The inequality is obtained by using (17) and (18). From (19) and (15), we have 
()
















, we have 
* p c > .  Q.E.D.  
     
  Proposition 2 suggests that when consumer tastes are uncertain, the usage rate in the 
service provider’s optimal two-part tariff is greater than the providers’ marginal production 
cost. Compared to a plan with a usage rate equaling to the marginal cost, the optimal plan 
reduces the risk faced by the consumers. The provider balances between insuring the 
consumers and avoiding the deadweight loss caused by a high usage price. Note that the 
service provider does not take much risk under the optimal tariff because the individual 
uncertainties are independent and thus the aggregate taste is almost certain. The consumers 
obtain zero expected surpluses and all the benefit from the trade goes to the monopolistic 
service provider. The formulation of the provider’s profit-maximization problem also 
suggests that with the optimal tariff, the market outcome is allocative efficient ex ante, 
though it is normally inefficient ex post. The model can also be used to discuss the case 
where consumers are not risk-averse. From the proof of Proposition 2, we can easily obtain 
following result.     
Corollary 1: If the consumers are risk-neutral, the service provider’s optimal two-part tariff 
** (,) Tp e n t a i l s  
* p c = .    13
Proof: If the consumers are risk-neutral, we have  '( ) ux being a constant for all  x R ∈ . 
From (14) we have  1' ( ( , ( ) ) ( ) ) 0 ub s qs m s λ − += . Inserting it to (15), we immediately have 
* p c = .  Q.E.D.   
 
Moreover, one can show that if the consumers are risk-seeking, the optimal usage rate 
should be less than the marginal cost. The proof of the conclusion is parallel to that of 
Proposition 2. Risk-seeking consumers prefer a relatively lower usage rate because it 
increases the variation in their ex post satisfaction levels. The results also suggest that 
whether the usage rate is greater than the provider’s marginal cost does not depend on the 
household production function. To give a brief illustration of the key idea of the model, I will 
discuss a stylized example as follow.   
 
Example: A monopoly telephone company has zero marginal cost. Consumers are 
homogenous and strictly risk-averse. In each period, a consumer needs to make either one 
call or none, depending on the state of nature. Each case occurs with probability of 0.5. The 
value of a call is $10 to the consumer. It is important to realize that the market is not like a 
health care or auto repair market, in which consumers benefit from the services only after 
they suffer a loss. In the current story, consumers need to use the service just because they 
find themselves in certain situations.   
If the monopoly company uses linear pricing, it apparently should charge $10 for each 
call. The consumers take no risk since they obtain zero ex post benefit from the service in 
either state of nature. The company earns (gross) expected profit of $5 from each consumer.   14
On the other hand, if the company offers a flat fee of T>0 dollars per period, the consumer 
has equal chances to loses T dollars (no call) and gain  10 T −   dollars (one call) of benefit in 
each period. The uncertain ex post benefit suggests that the consumer takes some risk in this 




TT T − +− = −  dollars, the 
optimal flat fee T must be strictly less than 5 otherwise the risk-averse consumer would not 
take the plan. Hence the flat fee plan generates less expected profit than the linear price plan, 
which means a flat fee plan cannot be optimal although the company has zero marginal cost.   
More generally, suppose the company offers a two-part tariff (T, p). A consumer who has 
signed up the plan obtains ex post benefit of either  T −  dollars (no call) or 10 Tp −− 




TT p −+ − −   5
2
p
T =−−  dollars. Because the consumers are risk-averse, they are 
willing to pay less than  5
2
p
T −− dollars for the service plan as long as  10 TT p −≠ −−. 




T −− ≥ (or  5
2
p
T + ≤ ), with the equality holding if and only if  10 TT p − =− − , i.e., 
10 p = . Note that with usage price  10 p = , the lump sum fee T must be zero. Since the 
company’s expected profit from each consumer is exactly 
2
p
T +   dollars, a two-part tariff is 
optimal if and only if it degenerates to a linear price scheme with  10 p = . 
 
3. Concluding remarks   
This paper considers a service market where a provider sells to homogenous risk-averse 
consumers through a two-part tariff. The consumers’ tastes toward the service depend on an 
exogenous situational variable. It is shown that the service provider’s profit-maximizing   15
two-part tariff entails a usage rate that is greater than the provider’s marginal production cost. 
Compared to a two-part tariff with a usage rate equaling to the marginal cost, the optimal 
pricing scheme allows the risk-averse consumers to take less risk. The service provider 
balances between insuring the consumers and avoiding the deadweight loss when it chooses 
an optimal usage rate.   
The finding may help to understand why it is common for usage rates to be greater than 
firms’ marginal costs in service industries. It may as well help to justify the linear prices 
observed in public utilities, video rental, toll roads, banking, and other industries where 
consumers do not subscribe the services in advance. Indeed, linear pricing in industries with 
increasing return to scale may not be as inefficient as previous theories recommend when 
consumers have uncertain tastes.   
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